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Special Economic Zones (SEZs) is an important aspect of China Pakistan Economic Corridor 
(CPEC) besides projects with regard to infrastructure, energy, and the development of Gwadar 
port. SEZs as growth strategy have static and dynamic implications for the host economy. In 
static sense, they help in promoting investment, employment, trade and economic growth. In 
dynamic sense, they result in infrastructure development, technological upgradation, human 
resources development, institutional and economic reforms besides urbanization. All of these are 
essentials for successful industrial development. However, the success clearly depends on the 
threshold conditions that need to be met in order to reap the potential benefits associated with 
successful SEZs. In this regard, the organizational structure of the development and operation of 
SEZs is of primary importance. For instance, the structure that resolves the problems of 
knowledge and incentives is deemed to produce the desired benefits. Likewise, effective labor 
policy combined with less dependence on subsidies ensure higher employment and competitive 
industrial development. Moreover, secure environment, focus on the domestic priorities and 
close coordination between stakeholders are among the essentials that lead to success in this 
regard.      
Key Words: CPEC, Special Economic Zones, Organizational Structure, the Problems of 
Incentives and Knowledge, Domestic Priorities, Coordination 
JEL Classification: F21, O16, O47, R10 
 
1. Introduction 
China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is an investment contract of around $62 billion 
between the governments of Pakistan and China. It mainly comprises the construction of 
transportation networks, energy projects, the development of Gwadar port, investment and 
industrial cooperation through Special Economic Zones (SEZs).1 Since its inception, there has 
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1 The activities with regard to Gwadar port includes the development of both the port and city and bringing 
improvements in the socio-economic development of the region. Likewise, energy projects are aimed at reducing 
shortages through different sources of energy like coal, hydel, wind, solar and LNG, and improvement in the 
transmission mechanism. Infrastructure focuses on the development of modern transportation networks through 
road, rail and aviation links. Finally, the investment and industrial cooperation would be enhanced through joint 
ventures, technological and human resources development under Gwadar Free Zone and other Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs). Accordingly, the Sector-wise distribution comprises $34 billion for electricity, $14 billion for 
Gwadar and the remaining $14 for hard infrastructure and related activities. 
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been a variety of arguments on media over its possible implications for the domestic economy of 
Pakistan. The proponents consider CPEC as a game changer as it would result in industrial 
development, regional connectivity, market access, and increased trade. To put it differently, 
modern transportation networks combined with energy self-sufficiency, larger trade potentials 
and SEZs are intended to create higher investment and employment opportunities which, in turn, 
would result in overall growth of the economy. However, on the uncertain side, we have 
coordination failure among the federating units over the selection of routes, the allocation of 
infrastructure projects and SEZs.2 Moreover, uncertainties associated with security, political, 
economic and cultural risks create doubts in the minds of stakeholders over the potential gains of 
CPEC related investments. Despite these opposing perspectives, CPEC offer both opportunities 
and challenges that need to be addressed in order to reap the potential benefits associated with 
regional connectivity, enlarged market access, and enormous infrastructure and industrial 
development. 
 Special Economic Zones (SEZs) is one of the important aspects of CEPC which is 
intended to serve as a strategy for industrial development and growth. SEZs are well-defined 
geographical areas which are specified within a country’s national boundaries. In these areas, the 
rules of business are different as compared to those that prevail in rest of the country (Zeng, 
2011). Alternatively, business environment within the zones is more efficient from the 
perspectives of regulation and liberal policy packages. SEZs encourage industrial development in 
several ways.3 First, they ensure efficiency in economic sense by offering a bundle of public 
services within a concentrated geographical area (He, 2002). Second, governments usually have 
limited funds that they can allocate for industrial development; so, if such funds are used within 
SEZs, they would improve efficiency by ensuring thrift in the public spending. Third, they 
facilitate joint ventures, domestic linkages, along with clusters development (Farole and Akinci, 
2011). Fourth, SEZs are associated with technological upgradation, urbanization, human 
resources development besides infrastructure development (Romer, 1993; Johansson and 
Nilsson, 1997). Finally, SEZs may serve as an engine of institutional and economic reforms 
 
2
 Alternatively, the lack of consensus may, further, aggravate political tensions and social divides and may create 
new sources of conflict in Pakistan. 
 
3
 According to World Investment Report (2019), there are nearly 5,400 SEZs today in 147 countries, more than 
1,000 of which were established in the last five years. At least 500 more zones (approximately 10 per cent of the 
current total) have been announced and are expected to open in the coming years. 
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within the country (Weingast et al., 1995). There are also some opposing opinions in this regard. 
For instance, in order to attract businesses, SEZs may result in an inefficient transfer of resources 
to zones which may result in rent-seeking (Moberg, 2015). Likewise, according to Chaudhuri 
and Yabuuchi (2010), SEZs may destroy agricultural land due to government’s quest for 
industrial development. Moreover, Lee (1999) asserts that jobs in SEZs may be comparatively 
insecure due to the mobile nature of multinationals within SEZs.4 
In this study, we want to highlight the prospects of SEZs in Pakistan. In particular, given 
the internal and external challenges, we want to discuss how SEZs can result in employment 
generation, export promotion, industrial development, technological and skill upgradation, 
urbanization and overall growth of the economy. Also, we focus on how the issues with regard 
organizational structure may cause failure as far as the development and operation of SEZs are 
concerned. Pakistan did not have successful experience with respect to industrial estates which it 
did establish at provincial level in order to deal with the issue of sick industry.5 However, there 
are some success stories across the globe in terms of SEZs. For instance, China is one of the 
success stories in this respect. In this study, by giving a comparative touch with China and other 
countries, we want to put forward the threshold conditions for successful SEZs. First, we focus 
on the organizational structure of the SEZs. In other words, we want to see how the problems 
with respect to information and incentives are resolved in alternative decision-making 
mechanisms. Onwards, we emphasize how the focus on domestic priorities like potential exports 
and imports, effective labor policy and control over the rent-seeking of the industrial class are 
important for successful SEZs. Finally, we shed some light on the exogenous environment for 
the functioning of SEZs. In this way, we want to give some policy prescriptions for Pakistan by 
resolving these issues. Rest of the chapter is categorized into five sections. Section 2 provides the 
background of SEZs in Pakistan along with the current agenda of SEZs under CPEC. Section 3 
highlights the corresponding facilities that are presumed to be offered in the newly established 
SEZs. Section 4 highlights the prospects for the domestic economy that are associated with 
successful SEZs. The challenges that need to be addressed in order to reap the potential benefits 
of SEZs are discussed in section 5. We conclude in section 6.  
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 Usually, multinationals can easily leave SEZs when their cost of production rise. 
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 According to Nawaz et al. (2015), Pakistan industrial estates are failure due to the governance issues and rent 




2. Clustering of Industries in Pakistan: Background and Current Status 
The performance of Pakistan’s industrial sector is dichotomous in terms of growth, efficiency, 
competitiveness and diversification. There are a variety reasons for this failure, but the lack of 
coherent industrial policy is the most obvious one. In 1960s, we implemented the policies of 
export promotion and import substitution which were based on instruments such as imports 
rationing, credits at the subsidized rates, over-valued exchange rates, and discriminated tariffs.6 
These policies had two effects on the industrial sector of Pakistan. First, in static sense, it 
resulted in higher growth rates of the manufacturing sector in the country. For instance, during 
Ayub’s Regime, we experienced an industrial growth of around 10% per annum (Khan, 2013). 
Likewise, the share of industrial sector to GDP rose to 11.9% in 1965 from 6.9% in 1950. 
However, as a by-product, these policies resulted in the creation of an organized interest group in 
the form of industrial class. Subsequently, the nationalization of 34 industrial units in the decade 
ahead not only retarded the continuity of higher manufacturing growth; but, also, it resulted in 
inefficiency and declining incentives on part of the private sector.7 Thus, the dichotomous 
performance of the industrial sector is due to lack of continuity in policies. In addition, the 
behavioral rent-seeking of our industrial class along with the geopolitics might also have 
contributed in this regard.  
The industrial failure in 1970s resulted in an increased number of sick industrial units 
which led the government of Pakistan to use clustering of industries as an additional strategy of 
industrial development. Accordingly, around 100 industrial estates were established in various 
parts of the country (Khan and Anwar, 2017).8  
 
6 The base purpose of this policy was the presumption that a small group of rich industrialists usually save more for 
reinvestment as compared to poor peasants and underpaid workers. 
 
7
 These measures created a considerable amount of uncertainty, resulting in a fall in private investment and flight of 
capital. Moreover, these policies had long run implications for the industrialization process manifested in the 
reluctance of the private sector to invest, which continues to date. 
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 An industrial estate is an area which comprises many businesses and factories in a single region. However, it is 
relatively small area as compared to special economic zones. Also, it has limited liberal economic policies. These 




Subsidies only induced rent-seeking behavior and allowed efficiency-reducing free riding 
by recipients whose industries remained less efficient than they would otherwise have been (M. 
H. Khan).  
of subsidies whose industries remained less efficient than they would otherwise have 
In addition, Pakistan have some successful industrial clusters which constitute as groups 
of interconnected firms contained in single geographical region dealing with common industry.9 
For instance, we have clusters like Gujarat Ceramic/Pottery Industrial cluster; Faisalabad 
Readymade Garments Manufacturing cluster; Tannery/Leather Industrial Cluster; Sialkot 
Surgical Goods Cluster; Gujranwala cluster; and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) Marble Cluster 
etc.  
A special economic zone is a broader concept as compared to industrial estates and 
clusters in terms of leniency in economic and tax policies. SEZs can further be categorized as 
Free Ports, Industrial Estates (IE), Export Processing Zones (EPZ), Free Trade Zone (FTZ), 
Technology Development or High-Tech Zones, etc. Since the SEZ Act in 2012, Pakistan 
promoted six of its industrial estates to the status of SEZs. They are Bhawal Industrial Estate, 
Multan Industrial Estate Phase-II, Rahim Yar Khan and Mianwali Industrial Estates, Rawalpindi 
and Dera Ghazi Khan Industrial Estates. They are expected to create 1.5 million jobs under 
CPEC. In Punjab, three addition SEZs were approved by the Board of Investment (BOI), 
Pakistan. They are Industrial City located on Trade corridor and M3 near Sahiwal interchange, 
Quaid-e-Azam Apparel Park (QAAP) at M2 near Sheikhupura Interchange, and 225 acres Value 
addition City near Faisalabad on Expressway. In these, we expect a turnover of around Rs. 1 
trillion along with the creation of 2 million jobs by their completion. Currently, under CPEC, the 
following 8 SEZs are under process.   
1. In FATA, we have Mohmand Marble City 
2. Mirpur Special Economic Zone which is allocated to AJK 
3. Moqpondass SEZ in Gilgit-Baltistan 
4. Rashakai Economic Zone (REZ) in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa 
5. Steel Mills at Port Qasim Special Economic Zone, Federal 
6. China Special Economic Zone Dhabeji which is located in Thatta, Sindh 
7. Bostan Special Economic Zone in Baluchistan 
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8. ICT Model Industrial Zone, Islamabad, Federal 
 
 Overall, there are around 40 SEZs expected under CPEC out of which 28 have been 
identified so far. For instance, we would have 7 zones in Baluchistan. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 
Punjab have been assigned 8 and 7 zones, respectively. Sindh would have 3 zones while Gilgit-
Baltistan, Islamabad and AJK have been allocated one zone, each. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the 
expected zones would be Mansehra Marble and Granite Industrial Estate; Chitral Industrial 
Estate (food processing); Hattar Industrial Estate; D. I. Khan Industrial Estate (manufacturing); 
Nowshera Industrial Estate (manufacturing); Bannu Industrial Estate and Karak Oil Refinary; 
and Ghazi Industrial Estate (manufacturing). Likewise, in Punjab, we would have Multan 
Industrial Estate-II; Pind Daden Khan Industrial City; Mianwali Industrial Estate; Rahim Yar 
Khan Industrial Estate; Bhawal Industrial Estate; Rawalpindi Industrial Estate; and DG Khan 
Industrial Estate. In Baluchistan, the expected zones are: Gawadar Industrial Estate; Lasbela 
Industrial Estate; Turbat Industrial Estate; Dera Murad Jamali Industrial Estate; Winder 
Industrial and Trading Estate; Mini Industrial Estate Khusdar; and Bostan Industrial Estate. In 
Sindh, we would have Chinese Industrial Zone near Karachi; Textile City near Port Qasim and 
Marble City Karachi. 
 
3. Special Economic Zones in Pakistan: Expected Facilities under CPEC 
There is a long list of facilities that are expected to be offered to the developers of SEZs and 
zones enterprises. The incentives fall into five categories: fiscal incentives; general incentives; 
facilities in export processing zones; facilities in industrial estates; and exemptions in Gwadar 
port. Table 1 in the appendix gives the summary of these incentives. In terms of fiscal incentives, 
as far as the development of SEZs is concerned; one-time exemption is offered for all capital 
goods from all taxes and custom duties. It includes all capital goods which are imported into 
Pakistan for the operation, maintenance and development of an SEZ. With regard to income 
which is accrued from the operation and development of an SEZ, exemption from all taxes is 
offered for a period of five years. Likewise, one-time exemption is given to zone enterprises 
from all taxes and customs duties on capital goods which are imported for installation within the 
SEZs. As far as the incomes of zone enterprises are concerned; exemption from all taxes is 
offered on income for a period of ten years till June 30, 2020 and for five years beyond. These 
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facilities are expected to incentivize investors to invest within the SEZs. Similar fiscal incentives 
are offered in Gwadar port as can be seen in table 1 in the appendix. 
 In terms of general incentives, all the SEZs, industrial estates and export processing 
zones would be offered utilities like electricity, gas, and others at the zero-point of the zones. 
Likewise, one window facility and dry port facility would be provided by the Board of 
Investment (BOI), government of Pakistan. In addition, the development of SEZs and the 
enterprises with in the zones would be regulated by transparent procedures and efficient 
regulatory mechanism. For instance, best building codes practices would be implemented. 
Likewise, protection to workforce and environment would be provided. The provincial 
government would be responsible to provide better security arrangements for the zones. There 
would be an efficient dispute settle mechanism within the zones. The continuity of these 
incentives would be ensured. For instance, incentives would not be withdrawn midway. 
Likewise, incentives would not be altered to the disadvantage of an enterprise. In the same way, 
as table 1 in the appendix shows, a detailed list of facilities would be provided to investors in 
industrial estates and export processing zones. 
  
4. Special Economic Zones in Pakistan: Prospects for the Domestic Economy 
There are three types of effects that Special Economic Zones (SEZs) might confer on the 
domestic economy of Pakistan. In static sense, SEZs encourage employment, industrialization, 
exports and FDI.10 For instance, firms in SEZs have connections to the local market, so they 
usually purchase production inputs from the local market; thereby resulting in employment 
generation and rising demand for the domestic raw materials. In addition to direct employment, 
SEZs are useful in creating indirect employment; however, it depends on the degree of forward 
and backward links between the local market and zones.11 With respect to raw materials, 
Pakistan can provide cheap raw materials to investors in SEZs like those for marbles, gemstones, 
textile industry, leather products etc. besides cheap human resources. In this regard, the 
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 SEZs in most countries are intended to incentivize Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), generate employment and to 
experiment with economic reforms via zone-exclusive trade and economic policies (Basile and Germidis, 1984; 
Litwack and Qian, 1998; Schrank, 2001). 
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development of SEZs should be based on specified products and services. Alternatively, the 
factors such as domestic raw materials, human resources and other inputs should provide the 
basis for the development of SEZs.12 Likewise, through regional connectivity, Pakistan can find 
market for potential primary products like fruits, fertilizers, flour, meat, vegetables, and some 
other goods. The incentives offered by the cheap domestic inputs, lenient economic policies 
within the SEZs, and efficient regulatory mechanism incentivize both the domestic and foreign 
investors to invest in SEZs. Again, the result is higher FDI and exports which pushes the overall 
growth of the domestic economy. In China, FDI rose to $4.1 billion by the end of 1980s with the 
functioning of the first four SEZs which was zero in 1980 (Khan and Anwar, 2017).13 Likewise, 
by late 1980s, the exported products through these SEZs rose up to $10 billion. In the next 
decade, in year 2000, FDI to China reached to $50 billion.14 The experiences of other countries 
show that the share of SEZs in exports is 78% in Philippine in 2005, 20% in Thailand in 2012, 
17% in Bangladesh in 2009, 22% in India in 2009-10, and 41% of the manufacturing exports in 
Vietnam (FIAS, 2008).15 In terms of FDI, the share of SEZs in total FDI is 22% in Bangladesh in 
2009, 81% in Philippines in 2000, 6.9% in India in 2011-12. Moreover, SEZs result in cluster 
development or in the agglomeration of certain industries, resulting in higher rates of 
specialization and economies of scale.  
In dynamic sense, SEZs are associated with infrastructure development, joint ventures 
human resources development, and technological up-gradation. For instance, foreign investors 
clustered in SEZs spread their expertise about quality upgrading and technology to local 
firms. Alternatively, domestic firms become competitive in terms of technological development 
and upgradation (Romer, 1993; Johansson and Nilsson, 1997). Likewise, the interaction of 
domestic firms with foreign firms result in joint ventures due to the spillover effects of mutual 
interaction. Moreover, product diversification and innovations are encouraged within SEZs 
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 In general, the availability of raw materials (natural resources in a region) and cheap factor of production is 
perceived to have direct impact on regional economic development. 
 
13
 China started with SEZs in formal way in 1970s. They developed SEZs in four districts such as Shantou, Shen 
Zhen, Xiamen in province Fujian, and Zhuhai in province Guangdong on experimental basis.  
  
14
 By 2009, there were overall 1750 SEZs in China. The contribution of these SEZs to national GDP, FDI and 




 See also, Farole and Akinci (2011), for details.  
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through joint ventures in Research and Development (R & D) activities. In case of China, 
investments under joint ventures expanded to $432.74 million in 1993, which is 171 times as 
much as it was in 1980. It can also encourage public-private partnership, especially for 
technology transfer. According to Zeng (2010), SEZs have brought new technologies to China. 
For instance, the average technological commercialization rate in industrial parks is 60% as 
compared to around 10% in rest of the China. Likewise, the average technological development 
in agriculture is 70% in agro-tech parks; while in agriculture demonstration zones, this rate is 
55.2%. Moreover, they are instrumental in the adoption of up-to-date management practices.  
Given the comparative environment within SEZs, we would have competitive private 
sector in Pakistan which is deemed as essential for the future economic prosperity of any society. 
As a by-product, SEZs result in urbanization as it provides favorable living amenities to 
technical personnel and workers in a concentrated area. Moreover, the development of SEZs as 
smart cities rather than isolated from urban areas/markets result in the economies of scale, in 
particular, with respect the ecological services such as solid waste treatment plants and water 
treatment plants. Since employment within SEZs is competitive, this would incentivize the 
domestic workers to get skilled. Alternatively, SEZs enhance the capacity of workers by making 
them more productive. In order to improve the vocational and technical skills of the local 
workforce, the Chinese government did establish training institutes in SEZs. Similarly, SEZs in 
Taiwan are instrumental in skill development by arranging joint training programs between 
enterprises in the SEZs and colleges/schools (Aggarwal, 2007; Aggarwal et al., 2008). According 
to FIAS (2008), Eco-zones in the Philippines have upgraded the skill levels due to their higher 
focus on research and skill-intensive activities. So, for Pakistan, in this regard, vocational 
training institute in collaboration with China is of prime importance.  
 In experimental sense, SEZs may serve as experimental laboratories where we can 
compare the effectiveness of various policy options by taking SEZs as a treatment group while 
the rest of the economy as control group. For instance, in China, the purpose of SEZs in the 
beginning was to introduce the market-oriented economic reforms on experimental basis within 
these zones. The reforms included changes in laws with respect to immigration, land 
entitlements, financial services, regulatory mechanism, taxation and customs, and labor 
arrangements. After successful experience within the zones, the corresponding reforms were 
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steadily introduced throughout the china. Thus, SEZs can result in initiating reforms.16 In the 
presence of politically decentralized mechanism, SEZs can indulge the regions in competition for 
capital. Even, the regions can compete in terms of initiating reforms on the local level. 
Alternatively, more political autonomy within SEZs, more faster reforms within SEZs than the 
rest of the country that we can expect.17 SEZs in China introduced significant reforms with 
respect to the security of private property rights, labor policy and land use policy (Zeng, 2011; 
Moberg, 2015). For instance, before 2004, there were no rules with respect to private property 
rights in China outside the SEZs. Thus, entitlement of the private property rights within the 
zones was a radical reform as far as foreign investors are concerned. Likewise, foreign investors 
can lawfully acquire the land use right for the development or business purpose. They also have 
the rights with respect to the lease, transfer, or mortgage of the entitled land for terms of use and 
specified purposes.18 With respect to labor laws, foreign investors are independent from the 
government influence in firing or hiring their workers. Wage reforms in zones was undertaken at 
a time when it was unthinkable in rest of the China.19 Thus, in Pakistan, we can initiate from 
SEZs to experiment with the economic reforms.  
  
5. Special Economic Zones in Pakistan: Threshold Conditions for Success 
As stated earlier, SEZs offer both opportunities and challenges. In particular, we have to resolve 
the challenges in order to exploit the potential benefits that are associated with successful SEZs. 
In this section, we discuss how the issues with regard to the organizational structure, focus on the 
domestic priorities and security are important for successful SEZs. 
 
5.1. Organizational Structure of SEZs 
 
16
 See, for instance, Weingast et al., (1995) and Moberg (2015) for details in this regard. 
 
17
 According to Crane (1990) and Auty (2010), SEZs may contribute to countrywide political reforms. 
 
18
 Moreover, China also offer exemption from land use fee to foreigners for five years when they invest in projects 
which are promoted by the state. For the next five years, they pay half of the usual fee. This exemption is given to 
projects which have an operational term of more than 15 years. Likewise, for technological advanced projects or 
projects with a total investment of at least $10 million, the land us rights is assured to them.  
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 The management of SEZs offer a social insurance to all permanent and most of the contract workers. Likewise, 
they also have determined an official minimum wage. These facilities were not available previously in China. Given 
the social protections and improved terms of employment, there is an enhanced migration from rural areas to urban 




The success in SEZs clearly depends on the organizational structure which deals with the 
development and maintenance of SEZs (Moberg, 2015). In the ideal world, it is presumed that 
policy makers are benevolent and well-informed social wealth maximizers. Accordingly, they 
would choose the optimal policies and pursue them without any hesitation for such 
maximization. In this world, the decision makers would resort to SEZs as an industrial and 
growth strategy when they are among the best policy options available for the development of 
the society. However, in real world, the assumptions of perfect knowledge and benevolence are 
rarely met as far as the policy makers are concerned. Once, we relax these assumptions, then 
successful SEZs require the right institutional context or the Hayek world.20 The right 
institutional context would be the context which can transform the actions of badly informed and 
self-interested agents into activities that maximize social welfare or result in the successful 
development of SEZs in this case. As far as the efficiency and effectiveness of the organizational 
structure is concerned, we have to resolve two problems: one is the knowledge problem and 
other is the incentives problem. 
 
5.1.1. The Knowledge Problem 
There are different governance models with respect to the development and operation of SEZs 
across the globe. In some countries, zones are regulated by an autonomous government structure 
as is the case in Thailand, the Philippines, and Bangladesh.21 In India, the department of 
commerce under the auspices of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry regulate the SEZs. 
Thus, in most countries, SEZs have some types of governing regulations which are updated and 
amended from time to time and case to case. In most of the countries, multiple government 
departments at the central level are involved in regulating and organizing the SEZs. In contrast, 
the Chinese model of regulation is based on a decentralized mechanism where the zone 
management enjoy a substantial amount of economic and political autonomy.22 Such liberal 
regulatory mechanism is the main factor behind the China’s success with SEZs. Alternatively, 
for successful SEZs, strong commitment from the governance structure along with sufficient 
 
20




 In Bangladesh, the autonomous authority is under the control of Prime Minister’s office while, in the Philippines 
and Thailand, such authority is under the control of ministry for industry and trade. 
 
22
 See, for instance, Tantri (2012) for details. 
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knowledge regarding the development and operation of SEZs are essentially needed. The 
knowledge Problem arises when the decision makers with respect to SEZs does not have 
sufficient knowledge of the market mechanism (Moberg, 2015). This lack of information is the 
root cause of the knowledge problem as far as policy making is concerned. For instance, in 
centralized decision making, the policy officials cannot understand the fluctuations in the 
economies or in the operations of market mechanism as the private businesses do. The 
consequence would be badly designed and misplaced SEZs. In contrast, in the private decision 
making, businesses are well-informed about the mechanism of market. Consequently, they would 
choose better locations for zones and, also, they will select best enterprises for the zones. 
Overall, the organizational structure in private decision making would be somewhat efficient as 
compared to that of the central decision making. In the middle of these two is the decentralized 
decision making which involve both the officials and private agents in decision making. Such a 
decentralized mechanism again is relatively efficient as compared to the centralized one. Given 
the successful global practices, Pakistan must adopt a regulatory framework which is simple, 
transparent and predictable. It should not only provide protection to investors and developers but, 
also, should ensure the clarity of roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders. In addition, 
such framework should be based on clear social, environmental and business standards along 
with attracting the right investments within the zones. Likewise, the surety of policy continuity 
and adequate provision of various facilities enhance the possibilities of zones’ success.  
   
5.1.2. The Incentives Problem  
The incentive problem arises when the incentives of the policy makers are not aligned to the 
incentives of successful SEZs or overall economic welfare. Just like other policy packages, SEZs 
create opportunities for rent-seeking. Policy makers will use these opportunities for their self-
interest based on the assumption of non-benevolent policy makers. One solution to this problem 
would be the private development of SEZs. In Private SEZs, the incentives of the private 
developers are aligned to the success of SEZs. Alternatively, with private development, when the 
policy makers would not provide infrastructure and other facilities to these SEZs, there would be 
fewer opportunities for corruption and rent-seeking on part of the policy makers. The success of 
SEZs would be directly related to the benefits of the private developers. Private agents would not 
develop the zones where the opportunities for profit-making are bleak. Global practices show 
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that privately developed zones become integrated townships which offer a variety of facilities. 
Alternatively, in such zones, a range of commercial and non-commercial activities are 
undertaken where private agents not only make profits in industrial activities; but they also offer 
profitable residential and other commercial facilities. China is a glaring example of the 
government’s commitment towards the development of zones (Zeng 2011). Its institutional 
framework, based on an incremental and decentralized approach for SEZs, comprises a 
management committee for each zone with significant involvement of the private sector. Each 
zone has a legislative mechanism which has the authority to develop regulations and municipal 
laws with respect to taxes and other related structures in line with the national regulations and 
laws. With such a system, the management enjoy substantial freedom in order to be experimental 
with reforms with regard to the success of zones. Thus, autonomy along with the involvement of 
private sector would solve the incentives problem. Our purpose for SEZs should be the 
development of competitive private sector which can lead to the industrial development on the 
principles of Schumpeterian Creative Destruction. Alternatively, zones should endeavor for the 
development of conducive business environment instead of just relying on fiscal and other 
incentives. In successful zones across the globe, the incentives like one-stop-shop services, 
aftercare and infrastructure are efficiently and effectively provided. For instance, these features 
make the zones very attractive for businesses in countries like China, Korea, Singapore, Dubai 
and Malaysia.     
5.2. Focus on Domestic Priorities 
One of the most important objectives of CPEC and the establishment of SEZs is to attract foreign 
capital inflows and generate employment. Likewise, the boost of domestic exports and 
technological upgradation are the other objectives of SEZs. In order to achieve these objectives, 
we must do rigorous planning. We should rigorously assess the conditions of local goods and 
labor markets by evaluating the demand situation. Likewise, we need to do planning for the 
supplies of labor and land for the zones. In addition, assessing the supply chain, industrial base 
and the overall business environment are of upmost importance. In this way, we can clearly 
identify the domestic priorities at each stage.  
 
5.2.1. Employment and Labor Policy   
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SEZs are aimed at providing employment and technical skills to the domestic labor force. 
Alternatively, within SEZs, the domestic labor force must upgrade their skills and deepen their 
knowledge by specialized or customized education and training. Investors within the zones are 
keenly interested in the skill upgradation of the work force because it is an essential part of the 
overall business atmosphere. We don’t have sufficient data in order to examine whether SEZs 
are helpful in creating new employment. However, we have some rough estimates for various 
countries in this regard. For instance, employment in Export Processing Zones (EPZ) in 
Bangladesh constituted 3% of the national industrial sector employment in 2008. In Vietnam, 
zones employed roughly 19% of the workforce in 2008 (Farole, 2011). In India, the growth in 
employment within SEZs was around nine-fold from 2005-06 to 2013-14. Likewise, SEZs have 
enhanced the quality of the domestic workforce through skill upgradation and training in many 
countries. Also, it is perceived that SEZs are helpful in providing employment to women. So far, 
Pakistan has not adopted any policy with regard to the protection of domestic labor in projects 
under CPEC. At present, the enforcement of labor laws is ineffective at both the federal and 
provincial levels. Inspections and regulation of labor market are almost absent due to the corrupt 
and biased lower-level labor courts. We need transparent and effective labor policy for CPEC 
and SEZs due to two reasons. First, we need framework for the employment of domestic labors 
within SEZs by the foreign investors. For instance, China has some labor relations with countries 
like Egypt, Nigeria, Mauritius etc. Egypt allow one work permit to foreign workers for every 
nine employed Egyptians. In Chinese zone in Suez region of Egypt, there were around 1800 
Egyptians workers along with 80 staff members of China. Likewise, in Nigeria, at the 
development stage of zones, Chinese companies employed 80 Nigerian workers for every 20 
Chinese workers. In contrast, Chinese workers face lenient policies from Mauritius as far as 
employment is concerned. In this regard, Pakistan should come up with clear policy. Second, 
policy guidelines should be established in order to protect the rights of workers employed by the 
foreign investors. The Industrial Relation Act (IRA) of 2011 specify the rights of workers with 
respect to working conditions, memberships in union, safety measures and workers’ other rights. 
The rules in IRA should be enforced in their true spirit.      
 
5.2.2. Focus on Potential Exports and Imports 
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One of main objectives of SEZs is to enhance industrial development on the basis of comparative 
advantages of the domestic economy. In order to ensure this objective, we must identify the right 
model which is based on the domestic strengths. Alternatively, we should conduct a detailed 
analysis in order to prioritize the areas within the SEZs. In particular, we should prioritize our 
imports and exports for SEZs by studying our potential exports and imports from the micro 
perspective. The market access that we can have to Afghanistan, Central Asian Republics 
(CARs), Middle East under CPEC should enhance our exports of fruits, vegetables, flour, 
fertilizers, meat, grocery products, textiles etc. This list must be expanded, and quality improved 
to indulge in healthy competition with Chinese exports under CPEC. Likewise, cheap energy 
products from either CARs or Iran may be our probable imports with increased access to the 
markets of these countries. Moreover, zones must be connected to local clusters/supplier as their 
value chains. For instance, in China, most of zones are well connected with the existing local 
clusters. Alternatively, local clusters and zones in China reinforce each other through business 
interactions. Also, foreign investors in Chinese zones are actively involved in joint-ventures with 
local businesses. In addition, the backward connections through technical assistance and other 
policy packages must be encouraged as is the case in China, Taiwan and South Korea. SEZs in 
Pakistan should exploit the domestic comparative advantages and they must encourage joint-
ventures and linkages with the local clusters.  
 
5.2.3. Controlling the Rent-Seeking of Domestic Industrial Class 
We would be successful in SEZs as industrial strategy when the incentives offered create a 
competitive private sector within the SEZs. Alternatively, we should tie all the incentives offered 
within SEZs to the efficiency of the enterprises. Given the history of incentives in Pakistan, 
industrialists take advantage from the incentives offered; however, they wind up their businesses 
once the incentives are exhausted. This is one of the main reasons for the failure of industrial 
estates in Pakistan. In particular, many industries in Pakistan stay inefficient and small even after 
decades of official protection through incentives. In other worlds, the incentives did not result in 
the economies of scale and exports growth of the domestic industries. The obvious examples are 
the sugar, flour, car and textile industries which are still nourished on subsidies. Besides 
subsidies, they are awarded with land in industrial estates at subsidized rates. Likewise, in 
privatization, they are provided insider arrangements. The persistent protection entails three 
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issues. First, subsidies once provided are difficult to remove. This issue is crucial when the 
institutional framework is weaker, and governments are elite captured. Second, subsidies create 
interest groups and, consequently, these groups lobby for the extension of such subsidies. 
Finally, a good fraction of the subsidies is spent by the interest groups for the continuation of 
such protection. Thus, in weak states, subsidies result in rent-seeking because in such states it is 
hard to resist corruption. In short, incentives in SEZs should not result in rent-seeking on part of 





5.3. Conducive Exogenous Environment 
In addition to the endogenous factors of concern, there must be a conducive exogenous 
environment for SEZs to function successfully. In this regard, coordination between stakeholders 
and security is of prime concern. 
 
5.3.1. Solving Coordination Problems between relevant Stakeholders 
Coordination failure is a situation when we have Pareto inferior economic outcomes due to the 
non-cooperative behavior of relevant stakeholders or economic agents. In this case, mutual 
coordination between the units of federation would have great bearing on the success of SEZs 
and CPEC. Alternatively, the decision-making mechanism should not be only with the central 
government; rather both the provincial and local governments should be given due roles in this 
regard. The joint decision-making or close coordination between the stakeholders would ensure 
the smooth functioning of the alternative programs within SEZs. Two aspects should be given 
due respect in this regard. First, the development of all routes should be made in a balanced way. 
In other words, the notion of preference for eastern route over western route by the central 
government should be resolved by making a balanced budgetary allocation for all the routes. 
Second, the distribution of zones and other infrastructure projects under CPEC should be based 
on the perspectives of both the efficiency and need. Also, the budgetary allocations for these 
projects should be made according to these criteria. For instance, finding the best locations for 
SEZs is essential for successful SEZs. Likewise, land procurement for SEZs is a crucial issue 
due to the opportunity cost of land. Alternatively, we should keep in mind the issues of food 
security, resettlement and loss of earnings which are associated with the large-scale land 
acquisition. In addition, land acquisition may also cause political and social tensions, among 
other issues. Accordingly, we should have close coordination between the stakeholders in order 
to resolve these issues. For instance, the distribution of SEZs should be based on the availability 
of raw materials, land and human resources. The availability of raw materials and cheap land and 
human resources will determine the cost of production which has been the focus of concern for 
most businesses. Likewise, closeness to transport connections such as airports and sea-ports has 





5.3.2. External and Internal Security 
One of the basic objective of CPEC is to obtain access to the markets of Middle East, Central 
Asian Republics (CARs), Africa etc. besides others. The performance of SEZs clearly depends 
upon the achievement of this objective. However, access to markets is rather a political issue. In 
order to have greater market access and, accordingly, successful SEZs, we should ensure both 
the external and internal security. In this regard, relationships with Iran, Afghanistan and India 
are of upmost importance. This is due to the fact that the principle of economics or market 
mechanism work only when it is supported by the right institutional mechanism. Alternatively, 
geo-political position combined with the supporting institutional framework would ensure the 
success of SEZs, market access, and the infrastructure projects under CPEC. In addition, internal 
security in terms of peace in FATA, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan and, even, in 
Afghanistan would pave the way for successful operations of SEZs. Finally, Pakistan’s market 
access is highly vulnerable to ethnic and sectarian tensions, especially those in Karachi and other 
areas of the country. We have to resolve these tensions in order to be in a beneficial position with 
SEZs and CPEC.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The motivation for this study is given by the current debate on the effectiveness of SEZs as an 
industrial and growth strategy under CPEC. Global experiences show that SEZs can generate 
employment, attract FDI, boost industrial development and exports, result in human resources 
development, technological upgradation and urbanization. However, there are several factors, 
including both the measurable and non-measurable ones, that are considered as essential for 
successful SEZs. In general, the location of zones; the price and accessibility of property; 
infrastructure, including both within and outside the zones; market access; autonomy within the 
zones; regulatory mechanism; fiscal incentives and other facilities etc. are important to have 
successful SEZs. In this study, we highlight the prospects for the domestic economy of Pakistan 
as far as the SEZs under the umbrella of CPEC are concerned. Onwards, we elaborate on the 
threshold conditions that are needed for successful SEZs in our case. We argue that, in order to 
be successful with SEZs as an industrial development and growth strategy, we should focus on 
the organizational efficiency of the development and operation of SEZs. For instance, the 
structure that could resolve the problems of knowledge and incentives would boost the 
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performance of SEZs. In addition, control over the rent-seeking of industrial class as far as the 
incentives within SEZs are concerned would result in the development of competitive private 
sector. Likewise, effective labor policy would not only generate employment; but it would also 
result in skill upgradation of the domestic labor. Also, we should prioritize our potential exports 
and markets for those exports in order to have beneficial effects on our overall exports and 
growth within SEZs. Finally, coordination between the relevant stakeholders combined with the 
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Table 1: Expected Facilities in Special Economic Zones under CPEC 
Fiscal Incentives 
1. One-time exemption from all customs duties & taxes for all capital goods imported for the development, operation and 
maintenance of an SEZ 
2. Exemption from all taxes on income accruable in relation to the development and operation of the SEZ for a period of five years 
3. One-time exemption from all customs duties and taxes on imports of capital goods in to the SEZs for installation therein.  
4. Exemption from all taxes on income for a period of ten years till June 30, 2025 
General Incentives 
1. The Board of Investment would provide One Window Facility and Dry Port Facility within SEZS. 
2. Gas, Electricity and other utilities will be provided at the zero-point of the Zones 
3. Captive power generation is permissible to developers of the Zones 
4. Continuity of Incentives: incentives granted cannot be withdrawn midway; Incentives cannot be modified to the disadvantage of 
an enterprise 
5. SEZ Act encourages transparent procedures for establishment of SEZs: Rules have been framed to simplify the procedures 
6. Best practices for building codes, environment protection and workforce 
7. Security arrangements by the respective provincial government 
8. For dispute resolution, administrative and alternate dispute resolution mechanism 
Facilities in Exports Processing Zones 
1. Developed land on competitive rates for 30 years 
2. Duty-free import of machinery, equipment and materials 
3. Freedom from national import regulations/ custom duties 
4. Repatriation of capital and profits 
5. No sales tax on input goods including electricity/gas bills 
6. Duty-free vehicles allowed under certain conditions 
7. Domestic market available to the extent of 20%. (exceptions may be available under special circumstances) 
8. Sales to domestic market are liable for payment of custom duties. 
9. Presumptive tax at the rate of 1%. Only EPZA is authorized to collect presumptive tax at the time of export of goods which 
would be final tax liability. 
10. Obsolete/old machines can be sold in domestic market after payment of applicable duties and taxes 
11. Defective goods/waste can be sold in domestic market after payment of applicable duties, maximum up to 3% of total value. 
Facilities in Industrial Estates 
1. Reinforced Concrete Road Network 
2. Underground Sewerage System 
3. Underground Electricity Distribution System 
4. Walled industrial estate with limited entry/exit points. 
5. High Pressure Gas Pipelines 
6. Telecommunications Systems 
7. Estate Manages Electrical Distribution System 
8. Fully Equipped Fire Station 
9. Computerized Weigh Station 
10. Technical Training Facilities 
11. Estate Owned Security Arrangements 
12. Hospital / Emergency Medical services (Social security) 
13. Potable water. 
Exemption in Gwadar Port 
1. Income Tax exemption for 23 years effective from July 01, 2016 on profits and gains from business set up in the Gwadar Free 
Zone Area. 
2. Income Tax exemption for 23 years effective February 06, 2007 for specified Chinese companies working on the Gwadar port. 
3. Income Tax exemption for 20 years effective July 01, 2016 for contractors and sub-contractors of specified Chinese companies 
working at the Gwadar Port. 
4. Concessions in terms of Sales Tax and Federal Excise duty is for 40 years on imports or supplies of materials and equipment for 
the operation and development of Gwadar port and is for 23 years on supplies made by the businesses to be established in the 
Gwadar Free Zone 
Source: Khan and Anwar (2017) 
 
 
